The Rise and Fall of a Democratic Symbol

4/21/20252 min read

After the reforms that occurred in 1998 due to the economic crisis, which also triggered public dissatisfaction, Indonesia's democracy developed into a promising stage, marked by open elections with a multi-party system. This continued for at least the next 16 years. However, leading up to the 2014 election, Indonesia entered a new phase where elections were characterized by populist political campaigns, such as promises to increase fuel subsidies for the poor, enhance access to education, economic equality, and other issues concerning the lower class. In this election, Joko Widodo, a "media darling" who came from a small town in the heart of Java, Solo, emerged. Starting his political career as the mayor of Solo, Jokowi (as he is popularly known) won the 2014 election and was then inaugurated as the seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Jokowi rose to the presidency as a common person, not of noble blood in Indonesia, during a time when Indonesia's democracy was improving, and the economy was relatively stable after weathering the 2008 crisis under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Jokowi’s election as president symbolized the victory of the common people, showing that even ordinary citizens could lead the world's third-largest democracy, a nation of thousands of islands with nearly 300 million people.

However, towards the end of his second term, with orchestrated political manoeuvres in parliament—where he was supported by almost 80% of parliamentary seats—a proposal to extend the presidential term began to surface. This naturally sparked controversy and debate, as realizing this would require amending Article 7 of the Indonesian Constitution, which regulates presidential terms. With the argument that he had the support of the majority of the people based on surveys. This idea was promoted by most ministers and coalition party politicians in Jokowi's circle, except for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), which had won two consecutive elections and had supported Jokowi since his time as mayor of Solo.

Beyond the issue of the third presidential term, Indonesian politics was also marked by the candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, who ran as vice president alongside Prabowo Subianto. The pair then went on to win the election, defeating two other presidential candidates: Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD. The issue here is that Prabowo’s victory was largely due to Jokowi's endorsement as the incumbent president, with his son running as Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate, after first amending the election law through the Constitutional Court. The Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Anwar Usman, who happens to be Gibran's uncle or Jokowi’s brother-in-law, facilitated Gibran's candidacy, allowing him to run in the election and win despite being under 40 years old. This is just a small part of the many examples of autocratic legalism played by Jokowi’s regime.

Furthermore, as Jokowi's presidency transitioned to Prabowo's, many statistical data revealed a decline in Indonesia's middle class, pushing them toward poverty. This, of course, worsened Jokowi's image, who was once dubbed "the new hope" by TIME magazine.

In this context, although Jokowi initially became a symbol of the people's victory, by the end of his presidency, public dissatisfaction increased, as expressed through mass demonstrations and especially criticism on social media. In this regard, I feel that it is important to understand how populism played a role in smoothing Jokowi’s victory, contrasting with the quality of democracy and constitutionalism, as well as the economic issues that directly or indirectly influenced the situation. In any case, by understanding this, it becomes a historical note for Indonesia’s democracy regarding the dangers of populism in deceiving the public in a political context and causing economic harm.